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GENERAL ARTICLES 
HUMAN CONTROL OVER AUTOMATION: EU POLICY AND AI ETHICS 
Riikka Koulu*   
In this article I problematize the use of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) 
applications to automate legal decision-making processes from the perspective of the 
European Union (EU) policy on trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI). Lately, the 
use of ADM systems across various fields, ranging from public to private, from 
criminal justice to credit scoring, has given rise to concerns about the negative 
consequences that data-driven technologies have in reinforcing and reinterpreting 
existing societal biases. This development has led to growing demand for ethical AI, 
often perceived to require human control over automation. By engaging in discussions 
of human-computer interaction and in post-structural policy analysis, I examine EU 
policy proposals to address the problematizations of AI through human oversight. I 
argue that the relevant policy documents do not reflect the results of earlier research 
which have undeniably demonstrated the shortcomings of human control over 
automation, which in turn leads to the reproduction of the harmful dichotomy of 
human versus machine in EU policy. Despite its shortcomings, the emphasis on human 
oversight reflects broader fears surrounding loss of control, framed as ethical concerns 
around digital technologies. Critical examination of these fears reveals an inherent 
connection between human agency and the legitimacy of legal decision-making that 
socio-legal scholarship needs to address.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: HUMAN CONTROL FOR ALGORITHMIC DECISION-
MAKING?  
Algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems are used across various fields 
either to assist and facilitate or to completely automate processes, which 
previously had mostly been conducted by human decision-makers. 
Increasing reliance on algorithms, defined as encoded procedures for solving 
problems by transforming input data into a desired output,1 is said to 
contribute to the 'algorithmization' of governance, a distinct form of social 
ordering that becomes entwined with autonomous algorithm-driven 
software.2 Algorithmization has given rise to concerns about the negative 
 
1 Tarleton Gillespie, 'The Relevance of Algorithms' in Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J. 
Boczkowski and Kirsten A. Foot (eds), Media Technologies: Essays on Communication, 
Materiality, and Society (MIT Press 2014) 167. 
2 Aneesh Aneesh, 'Global Labor: Algocratic Modes of Organization' (2019) 27(4) 
Sociological Theory 27(4) 347; Karen Yeung and Martin Lodge, Algorithmic 
Regulation (Oxford University Press 2019). 
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consequences of data-driven digital technologies, artificial intelligence (AI) 
and machine learning (ML), terms which are often used interchangeably to 
refer to the recent phases of the on-going computational turn. In this article, 
I examine the algorithmization of legal decision-making and the need for AI 
regulation from a socio-legal perspective.3 By focusing on how AI use is 
problematized in the European Union's (EU) emerging AI policy, I explore 
the problems associated with ADM that law should respond to and the 
question whether human control over automation is a feasible legislative 
strategy for addressing these problems. It should be noted that what 
constitutes a policy problem is not straightforward. Instead, 
problematizations are created in policy-making. 
The emphasis in current algorithm studies has been on algorithmic bias as the 
most pressing issue related to AI, following the realization that ADM 
systems reproduce and reinforce existing societal inequalities.4 In May 2015, 
an independent news outlet, ProPublica, published an exposé on algorithmic 
discrimination posed by the presentencing software COMPAS, 
demonstrating how the system systematically produced higher risk scores for 
racialized defendants compared to white defendants.5 Since then, 
 
3 Some scholars distinguish between algorithmic and automated decision-making, 
see e.g. Maja Brkan, 'Do Algorithms Rule the World? Algorithmic Decision-
Making and Data Protection in the Framework of the GDPR and Beyond' (2019) 
27(2) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 91, 94. I use these 
terms interchangeably, as I consider algorithmic decision-making as data-driven 
automation.  
4 Muhammad Ali et al., 'Discrimination through Optimization: How Facebook's Ad 
Delivery Can Lead to Skewed Outcomes' (2019) arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.02095; 
Bo Cowgill, 'Bias and Productivity in Humans and Machines' (2019) Upjohn 
Institute Working Paper 19-309, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3433737> accessed 27 
November 2019; Sara Hajian, Francesco Bonchi, Carlos Castillo, 'Algorithmic Bias: 
From Discrimination Discovery to Fairness-Aware Data Mining' in Balaji 
Krishnapuram et al (eds), Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (Association for Computing 
Machinery 2016) 2125-2126; Sandra G. Mayson, 'Bias in, Bias out' (2019) 128(8) Yale 
Law Journal 2122; Betsy Anne Williams, Catherine F. Brooks, Yotam Shmargad, 
'How Algorithms Discriminate Based on Data They Lack: Challenges, Solutions, 
and Policy Implications' (2018) 8 Journal of Information Policy 78. 
5 Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, Lauren Kircher and Julia Angwin, 'How We Analyzed 
the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm' ProPublica (23 May 2016) 
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algorithmic discrimination and other ADM concerns have been widely 
discussed topics in research as well as in policy-making and the mainstream 
media.6 The body of academic literature is rapidly growing and researchers 
working at the intersections of data science, AI ethics, law and policy studies 
discuss algorithmic fairness and different means to secure sustainability of 
ADM systems. The discussions have not emerged out of thin air. For 
example, computer scientists have long engaged in discussions on what it 
exactly means for AI systems to be construed as fair.7  
Against this background, it is somewhat surprising that algorithmization has 
mostly remained at the margins of socio-legal research.8 Karen Yeung and 
 
<https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-
algorithm> accessed 15 August 2019. The software's compliance with legal norms 
have been adjudicated on in Wisconsin Supreme Court's judgment in 2017 in which 
the court found that the criminal defendant's right to due process was not infringed 
by the ADM use. See State vs. Loomis 881 N.W.2d 749 (2016). See e.g.  Liu Han-Wei, 
Lin Ching-Fu, and Chen Yu-Jie, 'Beyond State v Loomis: Artificial Intelligence, 
Government Algorithmization and Accountability' (2019) 27(2) International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology 122. On algorithmic discrimination, 
e.g. Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel, and Aziz Huq, 
'Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness' (KDD '17 Proceedings of 
the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and 
Data Mining 2017 797) <https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.08230> accessed 22 August 2019 
797–806; Sloane Mona, 'Inequality Is the Name of the Game: Thoughts on the 
Emerging Field of Technology, Ethics and Social Justice' (Weizenbaum 
Conference. DEU, 2019). 
6 See e.g. Ghaffary Shirin, 'New York City Wants to Make Sure the AI and 
Algorithms It Uses Aren't Biased. That's Harder Than It Sounds' Vox (11 April 
2019) <https://www.vox.com/2019/4/11/18300541/new-york-city-algorithms-ai-
automated-decision-making-sytems-accountable-predictive-policing> accessed 22 
August 2019; Kevin Roose, 'A Machine May Not Take Your Job, but One Could 
Become Your Boss' The New York Times (23 June 2019) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/technology/artificial-intelligence-ai-
workplace.html> accessed 22 August 2019.  
7 See e.g. Ben Hutchinson and Margaret Mitchell, '50 Years of Test (Un)fairness: 
Lessons for Machine Learning' (Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, 
Accountability, and Transparency. ACM, 2019) <https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.10104> 
accessed 22 August 2019.  
8 ADM in the legal domain is by no means a new phenomenon but instead takes place 
against the historical backdrop of automation of legal processes through technical 
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Martin Lodge attribute this underlap of research to doctrinal boundaries that 
contribute to siloed disciplinary approaches.9 Some legal scholars have 
attempted to provide a systematic overview of the ongoing developments. 
For example, Julie Cohen draws attention to the dynamic reciprocity of 
technology adoption by noting how law plays a core role in shaping the 
dynamics of change while being simultaneously restructured in the process.10 
In turn, Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries emphasize the growing 
importance of due process and the right to contestation in the face of the 
computational turn.11 The socio-legal perspective can be seen as particularly 
important as it enables us to assess the sufficiency of existing legal and 
procedural safeguards. The existence of adequate safeguards separates legal 
decision-making from the many daily decision-making processes now being 
automated, as the first needs to cater to the overall expectations of 
coherence, rule of law, and legitimacy of the legal system. Simply put, there is 
a difference between adequate legal protection when an ADM system is used 
to curate search engine results compared to automated decisions on refugee 
status or citizenship, between profiling and decisions with enforceable legal 
consequences. But in order to assess the existing legal framework  of 
algorithmized governance, we first need to understand what the problems are 
and what challenges these systems pose. In other words, in the context of 
 
systems that has been discussed extensively since the 1950s. Much of the discussion 
has been framed in terms of AI & Law, although it should be noted that the concept 
of artificial intelligence (AI) is ambiguous at best. On origins of AI research, see 
John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester, Claude Shannon, 'A 
Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, 
August 31, 1955' (2006) 27(4) AI Magazine 12. Also, definitions of AI change over 
time depending on technological advancements as well as the so-called AI effect, 
where tasks successfully simulated by machines are no longer deemed AI, see 
Pamela McCorduck, Machines who Think: A Personal Inquiry into the History and 
Prospects of Artificial Intelligence (A K Peters 2004) 204. For an overview of the 
development of AI & Law field, see Trevor Brench-Capon, 'A History of AI and 
Law in 50 Papers: 25 Years of the International Conference on AI & Law', (2012) 
20(3) Artificial Intelligence and Law 215. 
9 Yeung and Lodge (n 2). 
10 Julie Cohen, Between Truth and Power (Oxford University Press 2019).  
11 Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries (eds), Privacy, Due Process and the 
Computational Turn: The Philosophy of Law meets the Philosophy of Technology 
(Routledge 2013).   
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which concrete concerns are we to evaluate the functioning of law, the 
effectiveness of existing accountability mechanisms, and the sufficiency of 
procedural safeguards? 
As a response to the public outcry, governments, industry and non-
governmental organizations alike are developing ethical frameworks in the 
hope of enabling fair and trustworthy ADM applications. These AI ethics 
guidelines provide an opportunity to pose the question above, given that such 
documents unavoidably need to reflect the perceived problems of AI and to 
simultaneously construct ethical standards as a solution. In other words, 
these documents encompass narratives about AI that justify the need for 
their existence. Sometimes framed as 'ethics-washing', the instruments have 
been criticized for their non-binding nature, the lack of a clear scope of 
application, and limited interpretative advice of fairness for programmers 
and administrators of justice alike, all of which contributes to their limited 
ability to regulate the development and use of AI systems.12 In terms of legal 
sources, these instruments can be described as soft law13 that lack formal 
validity but influence how policy issues are perceived. Not all soft law 
instruments are alike, however; instruments created by powerful 
supranational institutions such as the EU also rely on the authority of the 
institutions and not simply on the strength of their arguments. In this sense, 
soft law may also foster the creation of hard law by providing early 
conceptualizations of relevant AI policy issues that allegedly need to be 
addressed. The AI ethics guidelines usually advocate human oversight as a 
meaningful protection against the negative consequences of technology use. 
 
12 See e.g. Thilo Hagendorff, 'The Ethics of AI Ethics: An Evaluation of Guidelines' 
(2019) <https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.03425> accessed 22 August 2019; Brent 
Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter, Luciano Floridi, 
'The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate' (2016) 3(2) Big Data & Society 1; 
Daniel Greene, Anna Lauren Hoffmann, and Luke Stark, 'Better, Nicer, Clearer, 
Fairer: A Critical Assessment of the Movement for Ethical Artificial Intelligence 
and Machine Learning' (Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference 
on System Sciences. 2019) DOI: 10.24251/HICSS.2019.258 accessed 22 August 2019.  
13 See e.g. Alan Boyle, 'Some reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft law' 
(1999) 48(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 901, 901-913. According 
to Boyle, soft law is defined by its non-binding nature, focus on general principles 
instead of rules, and lack of direct enforceability. 
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Does this mean that hard law regulation should also aim to include human 
control as a legal protection?  
This article does not repeat the critique against AI ethics in policy-making, 
although the established shortcomings do form its starting point. I discuss 
one solution proposed in the EU's policy-making, namely human control, 
referred to as Human-in-the-loop (HITL), human oversight or intervention, 
human-on-the-loop (HOTL), or human-in-command (HIC).14 There is also a 
terminological connection between human control and the so-called human-
centric approach, which also poses a similar linguistic focus on human agency.  
Answering the question on legislative strategy for ADM requires us to assess 
the feasibility of human control from a socio-legal perspective, particularly as 
the EU is now developing the structures and processes to govern ADM 
systems, which are then established as legal rights, obligations, and 
safeguards. Political choices on regulatory objectives are translated into legal 
concepts and thus operationalized within the legal system. Once employed, 
these objectives and regulatory choices can become embedded within the 
legal structures and cannot be fundamentally contested. Human oversight 
may become a central procedural mechanism for automated decisions, but 
once it defines procedural rights and obligations it is more difficult to present 
a fundamental critique of its feasibility. That is the reason why it is important 
to ask now whether human control can fulfil its promise, requiring us to 
consider the problems of AI that call for human control. A regulatory 
strategy built on false beliefs about the strengths of human control may fail 
to provide adequate legal protection for those subjected to automated legal 
decision-making.  
 
14 European Commission, Independent High-Level Expert Group on Artificial 
Intelligence, 'Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI' (8 April 2019) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-
trustworthy-ai> accessed 22 August 2019 (Hereinafter Guidelines), 16; see also 
Communication COM(2019) 168 final from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions on Building Trust in Human-Centric Artificial 
Intelligence [2019] 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2019/EN/COM-2019-168-F1-
EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF> accessed 22 August 2019, 4. 
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At first glance, human control seems like a plausible solution, as ultimately it 
aligns with law's anthropocentricity, reflected in the fact that law recognizes 
only human actors as objects of regulation, not machines. At times, law goes 
to great lengths to uphold at least the fiction of this anthropocentricity, for 
example by granting legal personhood to corporations and non-human 
organizations. Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that the importance of 
keeping humans in control of automation is widely agreed upon in legal 
scholarship.15 The reasons given may be instrumental, such as of the need to 
allocate responsibility to human actors due to legal liability regimes.16 
However, there seems to be a more fundamental argument that considers the 
human element as being intrinsically indispensable, although this is not 
elaborated on in great length. Instead, human agency, participation and 
control are portrayed as uncontestable necessities that are ultimately 
connected with democratic legitimacy. For example, John Danaher contends 
that '[l]egitimate decision-making procedures must allow for human 
participation in and comprehension of those decision-making procedures' 
and that, because reliance on ADM limits active human participation, the 
systems impose a fundamental threat to legitimacy that he considers difficult 
to accommodate or resist.17 In her work on the intersections of law, 
technology and philosophy, Mireille Hildebrandt addresses similar issues of 
justification and discusses the need for protection of 'what is uncountable, 
incalculable or incomputable about individual persons', which comes under 
threat in the context of automated decision-making, where contestation by 
those subjected to automation plays a vital role.18 In contrast, others focus on 
 
15 See e.g. Woodrow Hartzog, 'On Questioning Automation' (2017) 48 Cumberland 
Law Review 1; Michael Schmitt and Jeffrey Thurnher, 'Out of the loop: 
autonomous weapon systems and the law of armed conflict' (2012) 4 Harvard 
National Security Journal 231; Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, 'The 
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions' (2014) 89 Washington 
Law Review 1. 
16 Madeleine Elish, 'Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot 
Interaction' (2019) 5 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 40, 41. 
17 John Danaher, 'The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation' 
(2016) 29(3) Philosophy & Technology 245, 254.  
18 Mireille Hildebrandt, 'Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From 
Agnostic to Agonistic Machine Learning' (2019) 20(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
83, 83-121. 
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the fabricated and performative nature of human intervention. For example, 
Sheila Jasanoff draws attention to the 'human pretensions of control over 
technological systems', which demands for critical re-examination.19  
This article is built on Jasanoff's call for critical examination of the feasibility 
of human control over automation. I argue that the focus on human control 
in policy decisions over automation is insufficient and misguided. I build this 
argument in two steps. In section II, I discuss the origins and limitations of 
human control over automation, considering research conducted on human-
computer interaction (HCI). The HCI literature provides insight into the 
potential and shortcomings of human control and hence explains the 
situations and conditions in which human control may be worthwhile. This 
HCI perspective is often missing in both policy-making as well as in socio-
legal scholarship. In section III, I engage in critical analysis of the EU's three 
policy documents on AI in order to identify the situations in which the 
documents advocate for human control as a meaningful precaution. While 
the explicitly expressed problems do form a starting point for this analysis, 
they do not provide an exhaustive overview. Instead, policy documents come 
embedded with implicit assumptions about the problems they aim to target 
and these problematizations are not necessarily the same as those explicated. 
The acknowledgment of how AI is problematized both explicitly and 
implicitly is necessary to assess the feasibility of human control for legal 
protection. By engaging in post-structural policy analysis, described in 
further detail in section II.2, I aim to reveal the implicit assumptions behind 
the chosen approach to human control. By contrasting the explicit and 
implicit problematizations, we can provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the perceived problems with AI that human control is thought to address. 
Finally, in section IV, I return to the discussion of human control as a 
regulatory strategy and the role of human agency in the legitimacy of 
decision-making. By incorporating perspectives from legal theory and 
European law, HCI and policy analysis, I hope to combine theoretical 
assessment of the feasibility of human control with a close reading of policy 
documents and interconnect these with de lege ferenda discussions 
surrounding AI. This approach contributes to a more comprehensive socio-
 
19 Sheila Jasanoff, 'Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing 
Science' (2003) 41(3) Minerva 223.   
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legal overview of the object of AI regulation and the complex 
interconnections between law, technology, and policy.   
II. ORIGINS AND LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN CONTROL  
1. Human-Machine Interaction Research 
In this section, I discuss some of the early research in human-computer 
interaction in order to demonstrate the context in which the early 
formulations of human control over automation emerged. Such genealogical 
analysis is necessary in order to understand what it means to establish human 
control as the core means of organizing the division of labor, as well as legal 
liability, between the human decision-maker and the ADM system. Human 
control over automation comes with conceptual baggage related to its early 
context and the level of technological development at the time that we need 
to understand in order to critically examine its feasibility as a potential 
regulatory strategy.20 The early work on human control was built on 
perception that humans and machines have differing capabilities, requiring a 
separation between the tasks entrusted to humans and machines 
respectively. This human/machine dichotomy has since been challenged by 
research focused on collaboration rather than division, but it still provides an 
important framing. In policy documents, the historical context of human 
control is typically not elaborated, meaning that the underlying assumptions 
remain outside the scope of policy debate.  
Originally framed in terms of human-in-the-loop rather than human control, 
early iterations are often traced back to post-war work on aviation security.21 
Some of the early iterations of human-in-the-loop were developed in human 
factors research in relation to aviation security in the US, with the objective 
of reducing human error and enhancing safety through a focus on the 
interaction between humans and computers. The early work on human 
factors was interested in function allocation, i.e. which tasks should be 
 
20 On conceptual baggage of key concepts see, e.g. Jan Ifversen, 'About Key Concepts 
and How to Study Them' (2011) 6(1) Contributions to the History of Concepts 65, 
73.  
21 See e.g. Elish (n 16) 40–60.  
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automated by computers and which ones should remain within human 
control.  
A starting point for this line of inquiry can be traced back to 1951, which saw 
the publication of the so-called Fitts list, which was meant to provide 
background information for policy makers. The list was drafted by Paul Fitts, 
a former US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and psychologist at the University 
of Ohio, who went on to develop a mathematical model to predict human 
motion called Fitts's law. The so-called HABA-MABA model ('humans are 
better at, machines are better at') included 11 statements to describe tasks 
humans are better at accomplishing and which are more easily performed by 
machines. According to Fitts, humans surpass machines in cognitively 
challenging tasks such as perception, judgment, improvisation, and long-
term memory, whereas machines are better than humans in tasks that require 
speed, power, computation, replication, simultaneous operations, and short-
term memory.22 Fitts list has remained a seminal work of function allocation 
research and, as will be examined in further detail in section III, the 
foundational assumptions have later been adopted and expanded in broader 
discussions on the necessity of human control over technology, most recently 
in AI ethics discussions.23  
While the HABA-MABA model now seems somewhat outdated, in its time 
it provided an adequate description of which tasks could be automated. The 
model reflected the contemporary state-of-the-art of technological 
development. In addition to technological progress, early iterations of 
human control also reflected political and ideological choices of the time, as 
 
22 Paul M. Fitts (ed), Human Engineering for an Effective Air-Navigation and Traffic-
Control Aystem (National Research Council, Division of Anthropology and 
Psychology, Committee on Aviation Psychology 1951). 
23 See e.g. Joost de Winter and Dodou Dimitra, 'Why the Fitts List has Persisted 
Throughout the History of Function Allocation' (2014) 16(1) Cognition, 
Technology & Work 104. On criticism, see Meg Leta Jones, 'The Ironies of 
Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with Fair Automation Practices Principles' 
(2015) 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 77, 106: 'The 
Fitts List has been heavily criticized as an intrinsically flawed descriptive list, little 
more than a useful starting point, insufficient, outdated, static, and incapable of 
acknowledging the organizational context and complementary nature of humans 
and machines'.  
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the model was adapted to the highly politicized topic of space travel in the 
Apollo program in 1960-1972. In space aviation, the involvement of a human 
operator was also considered necessary for automated operations with the 
concession that inclusion could take place remotely.24 Due to the geopolitical 
dimension, organization of human control became a question of ideological 
choice. David Mindell describes how preference given to human control 
reintroduced the perceived political differences between the American and 
Soviet approaches.25 Interestingly, the HABA-MABA model still persists as 
a key conceptualization of human-machine interaction and, as such, is often 
referred to in legal discussions on automation, albeit often critically.26 In the 
1980s, the human/machine dichotomy was increasingly superseded by the 
notion of 'human-centered design',27 although it is unlikely that the latter 
concept actually signified separation from the earlier doctrine, despite the 
terminological shift. Simply put, if everyone still refers to the HABA-MABA 
model, even critically, the model still persists as the locus of discussions on 
the central framing of human-computer interaction, and consequently 
continues to frame considerations concerning potential solutions.  
Function allocation research and later work on teleoperations, human-
machine interaction, and cognitive engineering have demonstrated some of 
 
24 'One of the pre-requisites for taking the man out of the systems operation must be 
the capability to describe very carefully, and in some detail, the characteristics of 
the operation before it starts. Of course, in some instances the man can be included 
by leaving him on the ground and providing him with necessary intelligence'. See 
Richard Horner, 'Banquet Address before the first Annual Awards Banquet of the 
Society of Experimental Test Pilots' (1957) 2(1) SETP Quarterly Review 1, 7, as 
referenced in David Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Space Flight 
(MIT Press 2008) 19. 
25 ‘Keeping the astronauts ''in the loop,'' overtly and visibly in command with their 
hands on a stick, was no simple matter of machismo and professional dignity 
(though it was that too). It was a well-articulated technical philosophy. It was also 
necessary to achieve the political goals of the space program and show that the 
classical American hero—skilled, courageous, self-reliant—had a role to play in a 
world increasingly dominated by impersonal technological systems (especially in 
contrast to the supposedly over-automated Soviet enemy)'. See Mindell (n 24) 5. 
26 See Jones (n 23) 130. In fact, citations on the Fitts list have steadily increased during 
the last decades. See De Winter and Dodou (n 23) 2.  
27 Jones (n 23) 112. 
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the inherent shortcomings of human control over automation. For various 
reasons, from boredom at routine monitoring to automation bias and alert 
fatigue, humans generally perform badly as supervisors of automated 
technical systems.28 These 'ironies of automation' were discussed in 1983 by 
Lisanne Bainbridge, who explained how automation design 'still leaves the 
operator to do the tasks which the designer cannot think how to automate', 
despite the intention to replace human control. These tasks usually include 
monitoring and take-over functions which humans have been shown to 
perform badly.29 Bainbridge argues that 'by taking the easy part of his task, 
automation can make the difficult parts of the human operator's task more 
difficult'.30 Similarly, the notion that accidents related to technical systems 
follow from human error was contested by sociologist John Perrow, 
according to whom systemic or 'normal accidents' follow from combined 
effects of tightly coupled complex systems that have high risk potential.31 
Thus, accidents are unavoidable in the sense that they cannot be prevented 
by simple design choices. In light of technological development and the 
introduction of the relatively autonomous ADM systems currently in use, the 
recent HCI research discussed above seems to provide a better account of 
the limitations of human control than the human/machine dichotomy. Based 
on these insights, the scope for human control over automation seems 
relatively narrow in practice.  
 
28 'There is much evidence that people are not good monitors of automation' for 
various reasons, including boredom that ensues from monotonous tasks, see 
Thomas B. Sheridan, Skaar S. B., Ruoff C. F., 'Human Enhancement and 
Limitation in Teleoperation' (1994) 161 Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics 
43, 54; Elish (n 16) 50 'skills atrophy when automation takes over'; on alert fatigue 
in the medical field, see Rush Jess et al., 'Improving Patient Safety by Combating 
Alert Fatigue' (2016) 8(4) Journal Graduate Medical Education 620, 620–621.  
29 Lisa Bainbridge, 'Ironies of Automation' (1983) 19(6) Automatica 775, 775-779.  
30 Interestingly, she considers human oversight as a necessity for complex 
automation: 'There will always be a substantial human involvement with 
automated systems, because criteria other than efficiency are involved, e.g. when 
the cost of automating some modes of operation is not justified by the value of the 
product, or because the public will not accept high-risk systems with no human 
component'. Ibid 777. 
31 John Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Basic Books 
1984). 
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One might expect that AI policy would be informed by these observations. 
Instead, it seems that the early human/machine dichotomy is still reproduced 
in policy-making without including later critical appraisals. Hence, policy 
documents portray human control in opposition to unstoppable 
technological change, rather than as hybridization of complex socio-
technical systems, i.e. seamless collaboration between humans and artificial 
systems. In their critical analysis of AI ethics documents, Greene et al. point 
out that  
the precise reasons why AI/ML are matters of ethical concern differ from 
organisation to organisation. Some lean on the language of distributive 
justice, arguing AI/ML's benefits and penalties will be unevenly distributed.32  
Greene et al. argue that AI ethics guidelines reflect ethical universalism and 
determinism, which means that ethical concerns are seen as a universal, cross-
species force of nature to which humans can only react. Simultaneously, 
human agency is advocated as a plausible solution, although in the form of 
expert oversight instead of public mass movement. Jones draws attention to 
the arbitrariness of policy-making that operates on the logic of human 
oversight: 'when presented with an automation-related problem, law and 
policy responses have been to preserve or protect an explicit value by simply 
inserting or removing a human from the loop, which actually ends up 
backfiring'.33  
Furthermore, Madeleine Clare Elish suggests, human oversight may be used 
detrimentally to assign guilt and responsibility to humans. Elish introduces 
the concept of 'a moral crumple zone to describe how responsibility for an 
action may be misattributed to a human actor who had limited control over 
the behavior of an automated or autonomous system'.34 Drawing on 
investigations of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 and the Air 
France Flight 447 crash in 2009, Elish demonstrates how in these two cases, 
the accidents were attributed to human error despite the fact that both 
resulted from a complex set of factors related to human-machine interaction, 
as well as to system design. According to Elish, law and policy play a role in 
the creation of moral crumple zones, as attribution of liability in aviation 
 
32 Greene et al. (n 12) 2127.  
33 Jones (n 23) 81. 
34 Elish (n 16) 40. 
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demonstrates: certification standards recognize only mechanical failure to 
give rise to accountability and hence only a human pilot can be the source of 
malfunction in situations of shared control.35 
Limitations and problems of human oversight are widely acknowledged in 
research, leading to efforts to improve the inherently flawed human-facing 
control of automation. For example, Brkan discusses the minimum 
acceptable level for meaningful human oversight in light of EU legislation, 
thus addressing the issue of 'rubber stamping', when human control becomes 
mostly performative.36 Drawing from the research field of AI & Law and 'by 
design' approaches, Almada proposes reinterpretation of human 
intervention in a manner that would complement post hoc oversight with an 
ex ante approach he calls 'contestability by design', through which the 
safeguards and data of the subject's rights stipulated in article 22 of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)37 would be embedded in the 
technical design of the ADM system.38 In turn, from the computer science 
perspective, Sirajum et al. argue that HITL should be a central system design 
principle, requiring solutions to certain challenges, most important of which 
is to determine 'how to incorporate human behavior models into the formal 
methodology of feedback control'.39  
 
35 Ibid 50.  
36 See e.g. Brkan (n 3), where she contends that rubber stamping is not enough for 
meaningful intervention necessitated by GDPR article 22 but instead the overseer 
needs to possess authority and capability to change the decision. 
37  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC. 
38 Marco Almada, 'Human Intervention in Automated Decision-Making: Toward 
the Construction of Contestable Systems' (International Conference on Artificial 





construction-of-contestable-systems.pdf> accessed 23 August 2019.  
39 Sirajum Munir et al., 'Cyber Physical System Challenges for Human-in-the-Loop 
Control' (8th International Workshop on Feedback Computing, 2013) 
24 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 12 No. 1 
 
Others have provided alternative problematizations of, while still advocating 
some form of human control as a potential solution. For example, Liu et al. 
attribute the problem partly to the current focus on the technical perspective 
of AI development that disguises the embedded heterogenous power 
relations.40 Rahwan assigns the problem to a lack of societal commitment, 
which could be resolved by 'looping in' society.41 Within the Human-AI 
Interaction field, Amershi et al. identify the core problem as being the 
unpredictability of AI-infused systems, which results from uncertainty and 
leads to false positives and false negatives; the remedy lies, they suggest, in 
improving user interface design following generally accepted design 
guidelines.42  
In summary, decades of research on human-machine interaction have 
developed nuanced approaches to human control and simultaneously 
demonstrated its practical limitations over automated systems. But does 
policy-making reflect these insights? And if not, do AI ethics guidelines end 
up reproducing these 'human pretensions of control over technological 
systems'?43 Do the AI policy documents take it for granted that human 
control ensures adequate ethical and legal safeguards?  
2. Engaging in Post-Structural Policy Analysis 
The fact that human control is advocated in AI policy, despite the limitations 
established by HCI, suggests that either the policy-making is built on false 
assumptions about the potential of such control or, alternatively, that the 
emphasis on human control serves a purpose other than de facto oversight. As 
discussed in section I, this purpose might involve the justification and overall 
legitimacy of decision-making, as some legal scholars suggest. But in order to 
 
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/feedbackcomputing13/feedback
13-munir.pdf> accessed 23 August 2019. 
40 Liu et al. (n 5).  
41 Iyad Rahwan, 'Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the Algorithmic Social 
Contract' (2018) 20(1) Ethics and Information Technology 5, 7.  
42 Saleema Amershi et al, 'Guidelines for Human-AI Interaction' (Proceedings of the 
2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, 2019) 
<https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3300233> accessed 23 August 2019.  
43 Jasanoff (n 19). 
2020} Human Control over Automation 25 
 
substantiate this claim, we need to look closer at the policy documents to 
identify the problems which human control is considered to address.  
What does a problem description in a policy document entail? I proceed from 
the observation that problematizations are fabricated in the course of policy-
making. In this sense, problem representations in policy-making are not 
neutral. Instead, linguistic choices reflect the power to decide which issues 
are worthy of policy action and which issues are not. This perspective aligns 
with the argument presented by Liu et al., namely that the narrow focus on 
technology diverts attention from the heterogenous power relations of AI 
development.44 In a similar vein, I argue that AI policy documents include, in 
addition to the problems they explicitly point to, implicit assumptions about 
the problems underlying the proposed solution of human control. To 
understand the intricacies of problem presentations better, I have employed 
a Foucault-influenced post-structural policy analysis called the 'What's the 
Problem Represented to Be?' or WPR approach in order to reveal how 
human control reinforces the old distinction between human and machine 
and attributes legitimacy creation only to human agency.  
What is the added value of this focus on problematizations for AI policy 
analysis? Foucauldian sociology has been particularly interested in the 
intricate ways in which power works through language, which often remains 
beyond the scope of more socio-legal approaches to policy analysis. Although 
such analysis might seem merely descriptive from the legal viewpoint, the 
objective of Foucauldian policy analysis is in fact diagnostic. As Nikolas Rose 
puts it, analytics of governmentality 'seek an open and critical relation to 
strategies for governing, attentive to their presuppositions, their 
assumptions, their exclusions, their naivities and their knaveries, their 
regimes of vision and their spots of blindness'.45 Consequently, the focus on 
problematizations aims to broaden the space of possible policy solutions. 
Hence, this diagnostic examination serves the needs of the socio-legal 
perspective as it provides a deeper understanding to support informed policy 
decisions on de lege ferenda. Other socio-legal scholars have conducted similar 
analyses in other fields of law. For example, Dent applies Foucauldian analysis 
 
44 Liu et al (n 5). 
45 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge University 
Press 1999) 9. 
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to examine the copyright regime as a governmentalist practice diffused 
throughout society.46 At the core of governing lies the process of 
subjectification, how subjecthood is not naturally given but created through 
governing practices that contribute to the process in which human persons 
turn themselves into subjects of governing. He argues that the field cannot be 
characterized by any single problematization but rather is filled with 
different government rationalities that can be made visible through a 
complete genealogical examination of copyright practices. In his analysis, 
'problematization is both a process of governance and a technique for 
investigating the acts of governing'.47 To this end, he argues, the advantage of 
problematizations is that it enables us to perceive multiple rationalities and 
purposes instead of a static 'monolithic, ahistorical problematization of 
(self-) expression'.48  
Similarly based on the Foucauldian sociology of problematizations, Carol 
Bacchi has explored how problems are constituted in policy documents and 
how governance is organized through these problematizations, with the 
objective of exposing how the political agenda behind 'chosen' problems 
insidiously defines what is possible or impossible to ask, which outcomes are 
desired or undesired, which perspectives are included and which excluded – 
in short, what the policy debate is about.49 The WPR approach contests 'the 
common view that the role of governments is to solve problems that sit 
outside them, waiting to be "addressed"' and provides step-by-step 
 
46 Chris Dent, 'Copyright, Governmentality and Problematisation: An Exploration' 
(2009) 18(1) Griffith Law Review 129, 131. 
47 Ibid 133. 
48 Ibid 141. 
49 'To say that policies create "problems" as particular sorts of problems, does not 
mean to suggest that governments set out to produce homelessness or poverty, or 
even to deliberately represent homelessness or poverty in particular ways. Rather, 
the proposition is that the specific policy or policy proposal contains within it an 
implicit representation of the 'problem', referred to as a problem representation. 
This proposition relies upon a simple idea: That what we propose to do about 
something indicates what we think needs to change and hence what we think is 
problematic – that is, what the 'problem' is represented or constituted to be'. See, 
Carol Bacchi, 'Problematizations in Health Policy: Questioning How 'Problems' 
Are Constituted in Policies' (2016) SAGE open 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244016653986> accessed 23 August 2019. 
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instructions for elaborating how problems are made within policy-making 
practices.50 The analysis involves 'working backwards' from proposed 
solutions to problem representations and, following a set of questions, 
drawing attention to the underlying presuppositions and assumptions as well 
as the emergence and effects of the said problem representation. In the 
context of the present paper, this means working backwards from the 
proposed solution of human control over automation to question what are 
construed as the 'problems' of ADM systems and AI in general. For my 
analysis, this means looking at how human control is formulated in the policy 
documents in order to reveal the embedded assumptions the solution 
presupposes. What does human control tell us about the nature of AI 
problems in the EU's policy? What history, context, and narrative are 
generated in these policy documents? Do the policy documents reflect a 
reasonable understanding of the possibilities and limitations of human 
control as they are discussed in HCI research?  
The WPR approach lists potential questions that guide the critical analysis, 
starting by identifying problem representations in search of 'a way to open up 
for questioning something that appears natural and obvious'.51 I focus in 
particular on questions that aim to reveal the hidden ontological assumptions 
behind policy formulations and what is left unsaid (and thus excluded from 
discussion) by these formulations: what deep-seated presuppositions or 
assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'? What is left 
unproblematic in this problem representations? Where are the silences? Can 
the 'problem' be conceptualized differently?52 The last step in Bacchi's 
approach is self-problematization, the reflexive application of the critical 
approach to the analyzer's own argumentation to reveal the selective choices 
that motivate it. In line with this approach, I argue that human control as a 
 
50 Carol Bacchi and Susan Goodwin, Poststructural Policy Analysis: A Guide to Practice 
(Palgrave 2016) 14. WPR approach is not interested in 'how different people might 
problematize the issue but how the policy itself problematizes it' (p. 17). Hence, the 
focus is on how problematizations are created by policy itself, not how individuals 
and organizations involved in policy-making processes perceive them. Complex 
policy documents often contain more than one problem presentation (p. 20), as is 
also the case with the EU's AI ethics documents. 
51 Ibid 20. 
52 Ibid 20-21.  
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solution to AI problems is built on a premise not unlike that of 
human/machine dichotomy of HABA-MABA model, namely that the 
actions of humans and technological systems can be clearly distinguished 
from one another and the former put in charge of the latter. The policy 
documents ultimately build a hopeful narrative: AI risks are construed as 
potentially harmful for human autonomy, but with human control these 
harms can effectively be prevented. Although aspirational, the narrative does 
not necessarily hold true in light of HCI research.    
III. MAKING THE IMPLICIT EXPLICIT: AI PROBLEMATIZATIONS IN EU 
POLICY  
1. The Explicit Objectives of EU Policy: Putting People at the Center of AI 
Development 
In this section, I analyze three documents that reflect the EU's current policy 
on AI ethics. The first of these documents is the Commission's 
communication on Artificial Intelligence for Europe from spring 2018 ('the 
Strategy'), mandated by the Council, which establishes the need for a 
European approach in order to reap the advantages of AI.53 The second 
document is the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI ('AI HLEG') drafted 
by the Independent High-Level Expert Group set up by the Commission.54 
The expert group delivered its first draft in December 2018 and, after 
stakeholder consultation, a revised version in April 2019.55 The third 
document is the Commission's communication in April 2019 on Building 
Trust in Human-Centric Artificial Intelligence ('Communication') that 
incorporates the key points of the AI HLEG guidelines.56 I first discuss how 
AI policy issues are framed and positioned in these documents, considering 
 
53 Communication COM(2018) 237 final from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council, The Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Artificial Intelligence for 
Europe [2018] <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-
2018-237-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF> accessed 22 August 2019, 2. 
54 Ibid section 3.3.  
55 See COM(2019) 168 final (n 14). As soft law, the Guidelines are meant to be adopted 
by stakeholders on a voluntarily basis.  
56 Ibid.  
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the terminological ambiguity of AI and what the perceived relationship 
between law and ethics is. In addition, I examine the intended usage and form 
as well as explicit expectations linked with human control. In section III.2, I 
then locate what has been left unsaid in the hope of finding out what remains 
beyond the scope of these policy initiatives.  
To understand better the explicit problems of AI these documents aim to 
address, we first need to look into what is meant by AI, i.e. from which 
qualities do perceived problems emerge. Interestingly, AI is not defined in 
technological terms in any of the documents but instead by reference to 
digital transformation and the increasing autonomy of AI systems. 
According to the Strategy, AI is one of the most strategic technologies of the 
21st century and is transforming the world, society, and industry like the steam 
engine and electricity in the past. AI is defined as 'systems that display 
intelligent behavior by analyzing their environment and taking actions – with 
some degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals'.57 The systems are both 
software-based and embedded in hardware and often require data to improve 
their performance. Hence, AI is seen to refer to relatively autonomous 
algorithmic models that infer outputs from input data. In short, AI is 
perceived as a combination of relatively autonomous data-driven 
technologies. This conception of AI is unsurprising given that data 
governance is at the core of EU technology policy. Furthermore, the GDPR 
creates a normative basis for automated decision-making that connects data 
subject's legal protection with human intervention. Article 22(1) of the 
GDPR provides for the right for a data subject not to be subjected to a 
decision based solely on automated data processing. Although exceptions to 
the main rule are stated in article 22(2), these may only be applied with 
suitable measures for the data subject's legal protection, the minimum 
standard stated in 22(3) being the data subject's 'right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view 
and to contest the decision'.58 The existing regulation also forms the basis for 
the development of an AI-specific framework around human intervention.  
What then are the stated objectives of the policy documents? The 
Communication states that the aim of the emerging AI ethics regime is to 
 
57 COM(2018) 237 final (n 53) 2. 
58 On GDPR article 22, see e.g. Brkan (n 3). 
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place people at the center of the development of AI – hence the formulation, 
'human-centric AI'.59 In the Strategy, the goals are described somewhat 
differently, in terms of boosting the EU's technological and industrial 
capacity, preparing for socio-economic changes brought by AI, and ensuring 
an appropriate ethical and legal framework.60 Understandably, the focus of 
the policy actions is on economic measures, given the EU's legislative 
mandate. The Strategy identifies the lack of trust and accountability as key 
AI-related problems. The new opportunities generated by AI are contrasted 
with the possible uses of AI for 'malicious ends', whereas the challenges and 
risks are located in the 'areas of safety and liability, security (criminal use or 
attacks), bias and discrimination'.61 The proposed solution is to develop AI 
ethics guidelines in collaboration with all stakeholders following the 
European Council's original mandate.  
The Strategy connects the ethical standards with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the values listed in article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. The Guidelines reflect the problems identified in 
the Commission's Strategy, i.e. the lack of trust and accountability, 
suggesting people's mistrust would prevent the adoption of AI: 'without AI 
systems – and the human beings behind them – being demonstrably worthy 
of trust, unwanted consequences may ensue and their uptake might be 
hindered, preventing the realization of the potentially vast social and 
economic benefits that they can bring'.62 It is thus claimed that the crucial 
problem related to AI is that applications would not be used, a problem that 
can be solved by increasing trustworthiness. Trustworthiness, in turn, is seen 
to be achieved by a combination of legal compliance, ethical principles, and 
technical and social robustness.63 The Guidelines do perceive that AI 
 
59 COM(2019) 168 final (n 14) 1. 
60 COM(2018) 237 final (n 53) 4. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Guidelines (n 14) 4-5.  
63 Ibid 5. 
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applications also present other risks, although these are not further 
elaborated on.64   
Ultimately, it is human autonomy that is seen to be threatened. Human 
autonomy is constituted as the protected good and the core ethical principle 
that necessitate human oversight as a safeguard: 
The fundamental rights upon which the EU is founded are directed towards 
ensuring respect for the freedom and autonomy of human beings. Humans 
interacting with AI systems must be able to keep full and effective self- 
determination over themselves, and be able to partake in the democratic 
process. AI systems should not unjustifiably subordinate, coerce, deceive, 
manipulate, condition or herd humans. Instead, they should be designed to 
augment, complement and empower human cognitive, social and cultural 
skills. The allocation of functions between humans and AI systems should 
follow human-centric design principles and leave meaningful opportunity for 
human choice. This means securing human oversight over work processes in 
AI systems. AI systems may also fundamentally change the work sphere. It 
should support humans in the working environment, and aim for the creation 
of meaningful work.65 
This means that the perceived threat of AI is the loss of human autonomy, 
particularly of those humans who find themselves interacting with AI 
systems. The proposed solutions are human-centric design and opportunities 
for human choice, which can be realized through human oversight of AI 
systems. This proposal implies that human control is all that is needed to 
ensure ethical AI systems. However, this is contestable given the insights 
from HCI research, which demonstrated the limited capabilities of humans 
as overseers of automated systems. Simply put, human control over 
automation often fails in practice. Furthermore, there is a more fundamental 
challenge to this approach: imposing responsibility for ethical AI on the 
human controller might be unreasonable from the perspective of the 
controller's legal protection.  
Human control as the solution to AI problems becomes visible particularly 
in the HLEG Guidelines, which present oversight as being necessary to 
 
64 'While offering great opportunities, AI systems also give rise to certain risks that 
must be handled appropriately and proportionately', see ibid 4. 
65 Ibid 12. 
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ensure that 'an AI system does not undermine human autonomy or cause 
other adverse effects'.66 This formulation explicates the problem as follows: 
without such oversight, the machines may be detrimental to human self-
determination. Human control seemingly does not need to be 
comprehensive in order to be considered effective protection. The 
Guidelines explain different degrees of human oversight from step-by-step 
monitoring in the form of human-in-the-loop to overall monitoring of 
human-in-command, noting that lower levels of human oversight should be 
accompanied by other safeguards:  
Human oversight helps ensuring that an AI system does not undermine 
human autonomy or causes other adverse effects. Oversight may be achieved 
through governance mechanisms such as a human-in-the-loop (HITL), 
human-on-the-loop (HOTL), or human-in-command (HIC) approach. 
HITL refers to the capability for human intervention in every decision cycle 
of the system, which in many cases is neither possible nor desirable. HOTL 
refers to the capability for human intervention during the design cycle of the 
system and monitoring the system's operation. HIC refers to the capability 
to oversee the overall activity of the AI system (including its broader 
economic, societal, legal and ethical impact) and the ability to decide when 
and how to use the system in any particular situation. This can include the 
decision not to use an AI system in a particular situation, to establish levels 
of human discretion during the use of the system, or to ensure the ability to 
override a decision made by a system. Moreover, it must be ensured that 
public enforcers have the ability to exercise oversight in line with their 
mandate. Oversight mechanisms can be required in varying degrees to 
support other safety and control measures, depending on the AI system's 
application area and potential risk. All other things being equal, the less 
oversight a human can exercise over an AI system, the more extensive testing 
and stricter governance is required.67  
Finally, the Guidelines bring forward a concrete assessment list targeted 
towards AI practitioners, with questions meant to ensure adequate human 
oversight. The list includes a set of questions on the level of human 
involvement, identification of the human overseer and moments and tools for 
intervention, existence of detection and response mechanisms for 
 
66 Ibid 16. 
67 Ibid. 
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autonomous AI systems, and the inclusion of a stop button or procedure for 
safely aborting an operation.68  
The expert group's recommendations on human oversight were included 
almost word for word in the Commission's 2019 communication, 'Building 
Trust in Human-Centric Artificial Intelligence'. In addition to formatting 
and slight changes of wording, the Communication connects human control 
measures with the adaptability, accuracy and explainability of AI-based 
systems, which in the Guidelines were discussed in terms of technical and 
social robustness and data governance.69 The Communication also contains 
a preamble to the description of human oversight as a key requirement for 
trustworthy AI. Finally, the user's overall wellbeing is highlighted as being 
central to the system's functionality.70 The Communication also sets out the 
next steps in establishing an AI framework, which include, inter alia, 
stakeholder feedback on the feasibility of the assessment list and potential 
revisions, as well as building the EU's leadership role in international policy 
settings with the objective of creating a related assessment mechanism. In 
addition, more funding will be targeted to research on explainability and 
advanced human-machine interaction.  
In summary, the EU's policy documents on AI ethics create high 
expectations that human oversight will safeguard human autonomy in the 
development and use of AI applications. The Commission's Strategy 
considers the lack of trust and accountability as the main concerns associated 
with AI, whereas the expert group's Guidelines present the undermining of 
human autonomy as one of the main problems that can be remedied by 
human oversight. The Communication of 2019 repeats these concerns and, 
unlike the earlier documents, connects required human control with 
accuracy and explainability. Interestingly, the question of interaction 
between humans and machines is only mentioned in the conclusions of this 
most recent policy document. Based on these observations, the policy 
documents reflect the assumption that human control constitutes an 
 
68 Ibid 27. 
69 Ibid 17-18. 
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effective accountability mechanism for the protection of human autonomy 
in the face of increasing AI use.  
2. Discovering the Implicit: Human Autonomy as the Last Stand against the AI 
Tidal Wave  
As discussed, post-structural policy analysis is particularly interested in 
locating the silences created in policy-making, as these frame the scope of 
what is construed as possible policy action. Policy documents typically aim to 
justify legislative action by imposing them as the right solutions to identified 
problematizations, but these stances are ultimately opinions about what 
needs to be fixed.71 How does this perspective play out with the EU's AI 
policy? What is left unsaid? I address these questions by working backwards 
from the proposed solution of human oversight, with the specific objective 
to follow to which actions and by whom the human control is extended. Who 
is the object of human oversight? 
The Commission's Strategy on Artificial Intelligence for Europe recognized 
the need to 'ensure an appropriate ethical and legal framework', suggesting 
that the current framework is not sufficient to ensure trust and 
accountability. In other words, the legal and ethical framework needs fixing. 
What, then, are the proposed solutions? The Commission's proposal is to 
carry out as soon as possible the Commission's agenda as defined in an earlier 
policy document, the Digital Single Market Strategy, including measures 
such as enabling free flow of non-personal data 'that will be a key enabler for 
the development of AI'.72 At the same time, the quick adoption of these 
measures is 'essential as citizens and businesses alike need to be able to trust 
the technology that they interact with, have a predictable legal environment 
and rely on effective safeguards protecting fundamental rights and 
freedoms'.73  
These statements reveal a two-sided and inherently conflicting perception of 
AI: on the one hand, AI is a good thing and needs to be actively enabled by 
regulatory measures; on the other, AI threatens fundamental rights and 
 
71  See n 49. 
72 COM(2018) 237 final (n 53) section 3.3. 
73 Ibid. 
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therefore needs to be reined in with legal and ethical guidance. The general 
public's trust, in turn, is linked with its understanding about the technical 
underpinnings of AI systems and thus explainability of the system is a key 
measure for solving AI-related problems:  
To further strengthen trust, people also need to understand how the 
technology works, hence the importance of research into the explainability of 
AI systems. Indeed, in order to increase transparency and minimize the risk 
of bias or error, AI systems should be developed in a manner which allows 
humans to understand (the basis) of their actions.74  
This statement is built on the assumptions that, firstly, humans are indeed 
capable of understanding complex technical systems and, secondly, that the 
human activities of seeing and understanding are enough to protect those 
values that are threatened by AI. Read this way, the problem with AI is also 
about people's lack of understanding that can be solved by human oversight 
which addresses this understanding.  
These risks are portrayed as unavoidable characteristics of the current 
technologies and thus constructed as 'normal' AI-related problems. By the 
use of passive language, these problems are attributed to the technology 
itself, not to the software developers and system architects, to institutional 
practices or organizational and market structures. In the Strategy, legal and 
ethical concerns are addressed by product liability, data protection, 
cybersecurity and intellectual property rights. At the same time, other legal 
mechanisms like competition law, administrative and procedural law, as well 
as tax law are excluded from examination, although these fields do provide 
effective mechanisms to ensure legal protection. Competition law in 
particular could be considered, because regulation of markets is a powerful 
tool that can also be used to guide commercial AI development.75 In light of 
these three AI policy documents, AI problems, it seems, are problems 
created by the technology, not by humans, and these problems should 
primarily be addressed by product liability and data protection regimes, i.e. 
only certain areas of law. This focus on certain legal fields frames socio-legal 
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problem solving, pushing us to address AI issues primarily within these legal 
regimes, which then diverts attention from alternative legal remedies.   
The policy documents construe risks and errors of AI not as products of 
human action but of AI technology, attributing error-creating agency to 
technology. This becomes apparent through the language employed. 
Although the need for ethical and legal frameworks raises concerns regarding 
AI being used for malicious ends, it is noticeable how passive language is still 
used: AI systems 'display intelligent behavior by analysing  their environment 
and taking actions – with some degree of autonomy – to achieve specific 
goals'.76 Similarly, it is AI technologies that 'require data to improve their 
performance',77 not developers employing certain ML techniques; once 'they 
[AI technologies] perform well, they can help improve and automate decision 
making'.78 Active language is used only when technology is seen to act, 
attributing a sort of agency to AI. AI systems are thus established as 
autonomous agents that need to be controlled by humans. At the same time, 
there is a sense of urgency that reflects technological determinism: these are 
societal problems that require legislative action immediately. This urgency 
indicates that this is a new situation, a tidal wave of digital transformation for 
which we need to brace ourselves, dictated by the inevitability of our novel 
historical situation. This sense of urgency resembles Ifversen's observation 
about the use of words such as 'crisis' or 'terrorism' to create necessity and 
legitimacy for policy action: 'such concepts defined for combat are used to 
frame a situation – or rather an event – that risks getting out of control'.79 
Because problems are portrayed as created by technology and not by 
economic and societal structures, AI is presented as a novelty and hence 
separate from the historical continuum of earlier forms of automation. The 
lack of acknowledgment of history also detaches policy dialogue from the 
lessons learned about the implementation of information systems in 
organizational decision-making in the 1960s and 1980s. This detachment 
makes it harder to contextualize AI problems in a meaningful way.  
 
76 COM(2018) 237 final (n 53) 2.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ifversen (n 20) 86.  
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At a textual level, the Guidelines create a contrast between human agency 
and the agency of AI systems, which again is established by the use of active 
language: 'AI systems should support human autonomy and decision making'; 
'AI systems should both act as enablers to democratic, flourishing and equitable 
society by supporting the user's agency and foster fundamental rights, and 
allow for human oversight'.80 Hence, there is a silence in the AI policy 
documents when it comes to humans. Only abstractions of humans are 
present, the human in control, but not the humans who could be perceived as 
objects of regulation. The abstraction of human control seems to imply that 
it is the closest human operator who is implicated in legal and ethical 
protection. Simultaneously, the technological focus ends up assigning 
subjectivity to AI and mystifying human capabilities as the last line of defense 
against this tide of foreign intelligence. In any case, attribution of agency to 
technology seems to be at the core of AI problematizations. It is the 
technology that needs to be subjugated.  
In the Guidelines, human agency is presented as being under threat from AI 
systems and human oversight is proposed as the solution to protect this 
agency. The agency of humans is threatened by the agency of technology, 
signaling that the AI systems need to be forced to allow for human oversight 
to protect the latter's autonomy. Again, the human actors are missing. AI is 
anthropomorphized into an autonomous agent that might be malicious 
towards humans: AI systems 'may harness sub-conscious processes, including 
various forms of unfair manipulation, deception, herding and conditioning, 
all of which may threaten individual autonomy'.81 It is this agency of 
technology that we need to be protected against and which poses a threat to 
fundamental rights and human agency, the latter of which is defined as the 
autonomy of the human user. Similarly, the Communication reflects an 
anthropomorphization of AI systems, locating the problem in the systems' 
ability to learn, which makes them autonomous from humans,82 echoing  the 
deeply-rooted concern for the loss of control. Humans remain out of sight, 
are hidden from sight: it is as if the AI systems develop independently to 
surpass humans, instead of programmers, systems architects and human 
 
80 Guidelines (n 14) 15 [emphasis added]. 
81 Ibid 16.  
82 COM(2019) 168 final (n 14) 2. 
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supervisors actively evaluating and implementing process automation by AI 
methods. But ultimately, the threat of technological agency to human 
autonomy is contained by human oversight. Despite the statement that 
oversight does not need to be total and continuous, there is  no discussion on 
the implications of human oversight, whether and how human overseers are 
able to perform their oversight tasks nor what would be the criteria for 
human intervention or whether an overseer should possess some particular 
expertise.  
3. Locating Silences: Promise of Control and Missing Humans 
To summarize, the policy documents attribute autonomy and agency to AI 
systems and portray this agency as something that needs to be enabled and 
reined in at the same time. The attribution of agency to AI systems is 
particularly blatant in the use of active language: in the context of the 
problem representations, only AI systems are portrayed as actors. The 
technological agency is contrasted with threatened human values and rights. 
The threat, it seems, comes from the technology itself, not the developers nor 
implementing organizations. Humans remain absent except for the abstract 
formulations of human agency, autonomy and oversight that are the object 
and the subject of legal protection. Similarly, situations of shared control or 
hybridization of decision-making are not discussed, further emphasizing the 
juxtaposition of human and machines. In short, the EU policy documents 
reintroduce the human/machine dichotomy from the Fitts list into AI policy 
setting.  
In addition, there is an apparent assumption that decision-making has been 
and still is a human exercise, but that this is about to change. The coming of 
AI is like a force of nature and the questions that remain are how to react to 
it and how to safeguard the fundamental values that are apparently in danger. 
It is assumed that AI systems are advanced enough to take independent 
action. The question is not raised as to what AI techniques can actually 
accomplish and what they cannot, nor why and how these techniques should 
be evaluated independently from other forms of automation. The fact that 
AI as such is not defined also raises the question of the extent to which these 
problematizations reflect the broader societal discussion on the perceived 
existential dangers of 'strong' general AI instead of narrow AI, which most 
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current applications are. At the same time, human understanding is perceived 
to be enough to rein in this powerful technology. In the end, we are absolved 
by the triumph of human cognitive skills, capable of seeing, understanding 
and acting on machine mistakes, demonstrating that these policy documents 
mystify the capabilities of human agency. Ultimately, humans trump 
machines.  
There are several silences, most importantly the surprising absence of 
humans, despite the stated objective to place people at the center of AI 
development. Humans are present only as abstractions as the human in 
control or the human whose autonomy is at risk. These abstractions, 
however, detach control from context. Give that it is the context that defines 
applicable law and ensuing legal mechanisms to exercise control, it remains 
unclear how a human controller would be able to exercise meaningful 
oversight. In this sense, it is possible that the technological focus could lead 
to a regulatory standstill, due to the role of technological neutrality as a 
central legislative technique.  
The focus on the importance of ethical standards prevents us from 
questioning the feasibility of soft law approaches rather than hard law 
regulation through binding accountability measures and market regulation. 
By assigning ethical concerns to technological agency, the discussion is 
framed in terms of the human/machine dichotomy. But do the ethical 
concerns described in particular in the Strategy, such as safety and liability, 
discrimination, cyber-attacks, not also exist outside the AI context? To what 
extent are the concerns, challenges and risks described related to particular 
AI techniques rather than broader trends of datafication, standardization, 
and automation? And, finally, how should we conceptualize and regulate 
situations of shared control over complex socio-technical systems, those in 
which human labor is inseparable from technological tools, in a way that does 
not unfairly assign responsibility to the closest human operators?83  
As discussed above, the final step in the WPR analytical approach is self-
reflexivity, which aims to make the analyzer's own problem representations 
explicit. I analyzed the three EU documents at a textual level, trying ascertain 
 
83 As Elish discusses, boundaries of agency become hard to pinpoint in situations of 
shared control over complex socio-technical systems. See Elish (n 16) 54. 
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whether or not the aforementioned academic discussions reflected in them. 
For example, was the shift from human/machine juxtaposition (the Fitts list) 
to problems of automation present in the policy documents and to what 
extent was the policy influenced by the interaction approach? Were the 
subjective ideological roots of human oversight normalized into objective 
knowledge? Where were the humans and technical systems at the textual 
level and which human agents were recognized as influencing the ethical and 
legal concerns of AI? Where do the vague ethical concerns emerge from and 
who creates them? These questions, although critical, take as a given the fact 
that human oversight often fails in repetitive monitoring tasks84 and that the 
focus on human operators hides other human actors from sight. Based on the 
earlier research, the analysis built on the assumption that human oversight 
refers primarily to operators not systems designers, architects, and 
developers. However, the policy documents did not reflect this assumption, 
instead describing human agency only in abstract terms. On close critical 
reading, the absence of human actors becomes apparent and this silence 
further draws attention to the conspicuous use of passive language, which 
emphasizes the agency attributed to technology.  
As my analysis was motivated by the concept of human control as a solution 
to AI problems and the observation of active/ passive language, I focused on 
relations between technical systems and human agents. Alternative 
approaches might focus on relations between different policy measures and 
their respective fields of law or discuss the economic agenda advocated 
particularly by the Commission. It should be noted, however, that inevitably 
there are other problem representations in these documents. As Bacchi and 
Goodwin note:  
it is highly likely that a WPR analysis may well need to be applied more than 
once in any particular applications. This is because problem representations 
tend to lodge or 'nest' one within the other.85  
The need for repeated analysis of problematizations may become particularly 
vital when the EU's approach to AI governance is expanded from soft law 
guidelines to hard law instruments.  
 
84 See e.g. Bainbridge (n 29). 
85 Bacchi and Goodwin (n 50) 24.  
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IV. THE SUPREMACY OF THE HUMAN OVERSEER: HUMAN AGENCY AS 
JUSTIFICATION 
Based on these observations, human agency, in the form of varying levels of 
human oversight, is portrayed as a central tool for overcoming the ethical 
concerns and risks associated with AI systems, regardless of the obvious 
limitations of human capabilities in monitoring automation. In the EU's AI 
policy, human decision-making is contrasted with algorithmic decision-
making, thus invoking the human/machine dichotomy instead of 
collaboration in socio-technical systems. Through the process of 
juridification, the notion of human oversight becomes a legal concept, 
binding it to the internal rationality of law. This in turn limits the scope for 
critique: law only accepts critique when it is framed in terms law understands. 
Simply put, the dichotomy becomes embedded in legal doctrine and frames 
future socio-legal discussion.  
The human control approaches reflect the assumed need to engage humans 
in algorithmic decision-making in order to ensure fairness and, ultimately, to 
address fears associated with automation and machines. Human oversight is 
about controlling unknowns, particularly unknowns of the technological 
variety. In this sense, human oversight as control over technology reflects 
something almost aspirational, a source of trust in the face of uncertainty. 
This promise of control is not simply about the feasibility of human oversight 
over automation, which has the obvious shortcomings discussed above. 
Could it be that human oversight carries this promise of control particularly 
because the fears and risks are attributed to technology, not the humans? 
This would suggest that humans are 'in the loop' to provide legitimacy, which 
is not necessarily linked to the practical feasibility of human oversight. Given 
this justificatory dimension of human agency, the feasibility of these 
approaches should be critically assessed before they are implemented as 
governance models, given that they may not in reality provide the solutions 
to the implicit problematizations. Instead, assigning problem-solving 
capabilities to human intervention might lead us astray as human oversight 
enables us to maintain law's 'human-facedness'.  
Why then, despite the limitations of human control and its connection with 
the legal liability regime, do we still maintain the expectation that human 
input in decision-making is fundamental? It seems that this emphasis reveals 
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something relevant about law's self-reflection: a connection between human 
agency, legitimacy of decision-making, and social expectations of fairness.86 
The legal system produces 'human-faced' law, conceptualizing law in terms of 
human agents, which the problematizations around ADM reveal. However, 
by juxtaposing machines and humans we seem to imply that ADM systems 
are somehow fundamentally different decision-making mechanisms. But as 
the algorithmic bias discussion demonstrates, human subjectivity becomes 
embedded in ADM systems, making them, in many ways, as biased, arbitrary 
and subjective as human-driven decision-making albeit implemented on a 
different level. Do we still unconsciously expect our technological tools to be 
less subjective than we are? It seems that we often still assign objectivity to 
technology and feel betrayed when our expectations are not met.  
Ultimately, however, human subjectivity wins against automation, as human 
oversight seems to imply. The strong preference towards human control, 
despite its limitations, suggests a deeper connection between human agency 
and the legitimacy of decision-making. In this sense, the policy documents 
use human control to justify the increase of automation. This reading echoes 
Elish's notion of humans as moral crumple zones and Jasanoff's pretensions 
of control, referred to above. In this sense, the emphasis on human control as 
the right policy solution for fundamental rights issues linked to ADM 
provides a particularly interesting viewpoint to the presumed socio-legal and 
regulatory challenges of AI.  
There is a sense of urgency about AI presented in the policy documents, a call 
for action, which still boils down to voluntary soft law instead of hard law 
approaches. The emphasis on soft law may seem surprising, as the limitations 
of voluntary implementation are obvious. If the urgency portrayed in the 
guidelines is justified, why then only soft law? The chosen soft law strategy 
may be explained by the division of labor, as the President of the European 
 
86 Self-evidently conceptions of fairness are very much dependent on individuals, 
contexts, disciplines, fields, and theoretical backgrounds. On quantitative 
definitions see, Hutchinson and Mitchell (n 7); on human perceptions see e.g. Nina 
Grgic-Hlaca, Khrisna Gummadi, Elissa Redmiles, Adrian Weller, 'Human 
Perceptions of Fairness in Algorithmic Decisions Making: A Case Study of 
Criminal Risk Prediction' (Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference. 
International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, 2018) 
<https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3186138> accessed 23 August 2019.  
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Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, intends to propose a comprehensive 
European approach to AI regulation in her first 100 days in office during 
spring 2020.87 Nonetheless, the policy documents suggest that the problem 
with AI is not the lack of a legal framework as such but instead the more vague 
notion of an independent artificial agency. Perhaps the importance 
attributed to human input reflects the idea that legal decision making should 
not be about automated information processes but about processes that 
produce justification and legitimacy. Perhaps these policy statements come 
with a promise for renewed interest in the ritualistic elements and societal 
values present in legal decision making or, put another way, in conflict 
management, the production of justification through procedural structures.  
Accountability mechanisms built on the assumption of a supreme human 
overseer are inherently flawed, if adopted without criticism. Such approaches 
can embed and reinforce the implicit human/machine dichotomy and mystify 
human agency. But it should be noted that the emphasis on human agency 
may serve a purpose outside monitoring automation, namely in justifying 
legal decisions. The importance attributed to humans in automation is not 
arbitrary but instead reflects the legal system's foundational concepts and 
ideologies that are built on anthropocentricity. In other words, juxtaposing 
algorithmic and human decision-making reveals law's self-reflection on what 
constitutes legal decision-making. Simply put, law's acknowledgement of 
legal agents capable of decisions is limited to humans or fictions of human 
agents such as organizations that are conceptualized as legal (although not 
natural) persons. Following this, justification of decision-making has 
traditionally been connected to human agency even when, in practice, 
decisions are arrived at through intra-organizational processes. In this sense, 
human control over automation can be seen simply as another formulation of 
human justification.  
This analysis has attempted to demonstrate that problematizations do 
matter, perhaps more so in discussions concerning technological governance 
 
87 Ursula von der Leyen, 'A Union That Strives for More My Agenda for Europe' 
(2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-
guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf> accessed 27 November 2019. 
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than in other fields less plagued by misplaced metaphors.88 It is not the 
objective of the WPR approach to provide alternative policy 
recommendations but instead to provide tools for critical analysis and to 
enable egalitarian politics.89 By employing measures of critique, we are able 
to open the door to critical examination of automation of legal decision-
making, the role played by human, non-human and hybrid actors in 
justification production, and ultimately, the feasibility of anthropocentric 
legal concepts to address this hybridisation. We can call attention to the 
justification of decisions and the legitimacy of decision-making processes 
and examine what exactly changes through implementation of ADM 
systems. Finally, the promise of this approach lies in a more nuanced 
understanding of how decisions come about. After acknowledging the 
fabricated nature of the problems associated with ADM, we can start 
thinking about meaningful partnerships between human agents and the 
automation of legal decision-making. 
V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR AI POLICY AND SOCIO-LEGAL 
RESEARCH  
What implications follow from this analysis of the EU's AI policy focus on 
human control over automation? Two particular future avenues for analysis 
emerge. Firstly, what can and should we regulate and how can socio-legal 
scholarship facilitate the development of new effective regulatory strategies? 
As discussed, there is an inherent tension between technology-oriented 
policy and the principle of technological neutrality as guiding legislative 
strategy. This tension needs to be addressed if we want to pursue 
technological governance from an AI-specific perspective. The focus on 
technology may also be problematic due to the terminological ambiguity of 
AI and a significant theoretical issue relates to the legal system's limited focus 
on humans as objects of regulation. Difficult policy choices become entwined 
 
88 See e.g. Sheldon Ungar, 'Misplaced Metaphor: A Critical Analysis of the 
"Knowledge Society" (2003) 40(3) Canadian Review of Sociology 331, 331-347; 
Marinus Ossewaarde, 'Digital Transformation and the Renewal of Social Theory: 
Unpacking the New Fraudulent Myths and Misplaced Metaphors' (2019) 146 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 24, 24-30. 
89 Bacchi and Goodwin (n 50) 25.  
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with the need for critical socio-legal scholarship: should we forego the 
principle of technological neutrality or should we hold on to law's 
anthropocentricity? What exactly would these choices entail? If we stick 
with regulating human behavior, what criteria should be used to identify the 
'human' in complex socio-technical systems? In any case, discussion of the 
objectives of AI regulation is unavoidable. To this end, a careful and context-
specific analysis of the current legislative framework is needed to understand 
better whether existing legal safeguards possess enough interpretative 
flexibility to address the problems related to AI in the policy context. Such 
an examination also needs to address the efficiency of administrative and 
procedural safeguards beyond human control and contextualize the current 
debate within the broader historical development from the introduction of 
standards to data-driven automation of legal decision-making processes 
through information systems. If regulation is pursued, special attention 
should be paid to the creation of accountability mechanisms in a manner that 
does not impose unrealistic expectations on human operators but instead 
pursues a more rigorous interaction design. If we ignore the hybridization of 
legal decision-making that ADM models impose, there is a danger of 
assigning human decision makers the role of rubber-stampers with 
problematic consequences for legitimacy and justification. 
Secondly, policy debates around AI ethics provide an interesting context in 
which to discuss the relationships between law, politics, and ethics, and 
reveals a way to examine the juridification of technological governance from 
soft law to hard law. As discussed, soft law guidelines are bound to frame the 
societal debate concerning AI challenges and their proposed solutions may 
have normative consequences in shaping future hard law instruments. The 
juridification of such concepts, i.e. their translation into binding concepts of 
positive law, also disguises the heterogenous value-laden and ideological 
choices present in the political creation of AI ethics guidelines. The 
juridification binds concepts established in policy-making to the legal 
sphere's internal perspective. This process reflects the long-standing 
distinction between the political and legal systems and their separate societal 
functions, built on the idea that the political system debates societal 
objectives and establishes a compromise in the form of legislation, after 
which the legal system takes over its application and interpretation. This 
means that within the legal system there is limited space for fundamental 
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critique about the acceptability of legislative intent. In other words, the 
translation from politics to law limits the grounds on which these concepts 
can be criticized: from the legal system's normative view, only immanent 
critique preserving law's internal rationality is recognized as valid.90  
What makes human control over automation such a tempting solution for 
digital technologies is its relatively easy implementation. Human control 
comes with the promise of a relatively simple and operational way to address 
AI-related issues: to operationalize human control both within the legal 
system and software development requires relatively easy political choices 
that can be met by establishing a legal right to human oversight and then 
creating technical design solutions for implementing this right within the 
technological architecture. Especially if the alternative is to engage in 
grueling societal debates over the dynamics of technological change and the 
critical analysis of existing societal power imbalances, such solutions provide 
attractive and straightforward policy actions.91 But perhaps the latter is 
exactly what is needed. To better understand the complexities and societal 
issues related to the ongoing algorithmization and to assess different policy 
options, it is necessary to broaden the discussion from the current focus on 
technology and ethics to discussions about societal structures and law.  
 
 
90 On immanent critique, see Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002) 
29–30. See also Riikka Koulu, Law, Technology, Dispute Resolution: Privatisation of 
Coercion (Routledge 2019) 37.  
91 Cf. Kenneth C. Laudon, Computers and Bureaucratic Reform: The Political Functions 
of Urban Information Systems (John Wiley & Sons 1974) 52-53. 
